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Abstract 
 
 The dynamics of government debt and economic growth, once a subject of 
interest mostly to very few macroeconomists is suddenly of immense attention 
for many researchers in the backdrop of Euro zone sovereign debt crisis and 
Reinhart & Rogoff‘s related research. This study investigates the government 
debt – growth relationship and contributes to literature in the following ways: 
First, we extend the horizon of analysis to several country groupings and make 
the study inclusive of economic, political and regional diversities based on a 
sizeable dataset. Second, we provide evidence for the presence of a causal link 
going from debt to growth with the use of ‗instrumental variables approach‘ 
unlike the RR approach. Third, we overcome the issues related to data 
adequacy, coverage of countries, heterogeneity, endogeneity, and non-
linearities by conducting a battery of robustness tests. We find that a 10-
percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with 2 to 23 
basis point reduction in average growth. Our results establish the nonlinear 
relationship between debt and growth.   
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1. Introduction 
 Do sovereign countries with high government debt tend to grow slowly? - has been an 
important policy question in the recent times. As the current debt trajectories in several 
economies around the world are not sustainable, there is a growing concern among the 
policymakers, central banks, and international policy organizations to understand the effects 
of government debt on economic growth. Many of the countries in the euro zone and more 
particularly Greece are struggling with a combination of high levels of indebtedness, budget 
deficits and frail growth. This has necessitated the revival of the academic and policy debate 
on the impact of rising levels of government debt on economic growth.  
 
 A growing empirical literature shows that there is a negative correlation between 
government debt and economic growth. This correlation becomes particularly strong when 
government debt approaches 100% of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010a; 2010b; Kumar and 
Woo 2010; Cecchetti et al. 2011). Reinhart and Rogoff (RR), in some of their influential 
articles, argue that higher levels of government debt are negatively correlated with economic 
growth, but that there is no link between debt and growth when government debt is below 
90% of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010a; Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff 2012). They deftly 
state that their results did not prove the existence of a causal relationship going from debt to 
growth. RR‘s findings have kindled a new literature seeking to assess whether their results 
were robust to allow for non-arbitrary debt brackets, control variables in a multivariate 
regression setup, reverse causality, and cross-country heterogeneity. After the publication of 
the (critique) article by Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) challenging some of RR‘s findings, 
the discussion on the relationship between debt and growth in advanced economies has 
become more animated. Krugman (2010), citing the case of Japan, argues that the link 
between debt and growth could be driven by the fact that it is low economic growth that leads 
to high levels of government debt.  
 
 Empirical research, of late, has begun to focus on possibilities of non-linearities within 
the debt-growth nexus, with specific attention to high government debt levels. The empirical 
literature on this issue remains sparse as very few studies employ non-linear impact analysis. 
Studies by Chang and Chiang (2009), Cecchetti et al., (2011), and Baum et al., (2013) 
provide some contribution in this direction. Chang and Chiang (2009) and Cecchetti et al., 
(2011) employ non-linear panel threshold approach for non-dynamic panels.  
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 We notice three inadequacies in the empirical literature on debt-growth nexus. First, 
none of the studies has focused on the different groupings of economies based on their 
political structures, income levels, regional geographies and debt regimes. Second,  we do not 
find studies emphasising the need for establishing the presence of a causal link going from 
debt to growth that requires finding what economists call an ‗instrumental variable‘. Third, 
there is a need to expand the horizon of the data sample, as averaging across OECD / 
advanced countries alone would make such inferences difficult. 
 
 Our study is unique as it overcomes the issues related to data adequacy, coverage of 
countries, heterogeneity, endogeneity, and non-linearities. We contribute to the current strand 
of literature on government debt and economic growth by extending the horizon of analysis 
to several country groupings and make the study inclusive of economic, political and regional 
diversities. We provide a thorough econometric analysis of countries with large sample 
drawn from diverse groupings that allows for non-linearity estimation. Our data-intensive 
approach offers stylized facts, well beyond selective anecdotal evidence. We offer to provide 
evidence for the presence of a causal link going from debt to growth with the use of 
‗instrumental variables approach‘ unlike the RR approach. This paper makes a distinct 
contribution to the debate by offering new empirical evidence based on a sizeable dataset. 
 
 The paper is organised as follows. We present our data in section 2. In section 3, we 
analyse the government debt-economic growth nexus. Section 4 describes our estimation 
strategy. In section 5, we provide the detailed discussion on results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 Our dataset comprises annual macroeconomic data on 252 countries, over the period 
1960-2009. To maintain homogeneity in as much as it is for a large sample of countries over 
the course of five decades, we employ as a primarily source – World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database 2014 of World Bank. We strengthen our data with the use of supplementary 
data sourced from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2014 database, 
International Financial Statistics and data files, and Reinhart and Rogoff dataset on Debt-to-
GDP ratios. 
  We arrange our sample data into five broad categories: (i) debt regimes, (ii) economy 
groupings, (iii) income groupings, (iv) political governance groupings, and (v) regional 
groupings. We place each of the 252 countries in the WDI list into its relevant category of our 
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country groupings. However, each country‘s entry into the group is dependent on the data 
adequacy. Exclusion of any country of the WDI list from our sampling is solely due to data 
considerations (either non-availability or inadequacy of data). Further, for lack of complete 
data for the stated variables for all the required time period in executing the panel GMM IV 
approach based regressions, some of the countries could not make into the detailed 
econometric analyses of debt-growth nexus. The list of countries covered in detail under 
different groupings and sub-groupings are provided in annexure 1 to 5.  
 
Debt regime groupings 
 We group our sample countries into five debt regime groupings: 0-30%, 31-60%, 61-
90%, 91-150%, and >151% comparable to RR groupings based on the average debt/GDP 
levels (Table 1).  
 Table 1: Sample description for debt regimes 
Panel A: Sample frame for debt regime groupings 
Period DR 0-30% DR 31-60% DR 61-90% DR 91 & above DR 151 & above Total 
1960-2009 29 56 18 14 5 122 
1970-2009 32 52 20 14 4 122 
1980-2009 24 53 24 16 5 122 
1990-2009 24 51 24 18 5 122 
2000-2009 24 45 20 13 5 107 
Panel B: Government Debt and GDP Growth in debt regimes  
Countries observations Debt Regime 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
8 160 0-30% 5.06% 4.83% 27.15 27.79 
31 620 31-60% 3.79% 3.68% 58.29 45.00 
20 400 61-90% 2.71% 2.70% 80.08 82.87 
13 260 91-150% 1.86% 1.88% 115.50 116.51 
4 80 >151% -1.08% -1.32% 176.75 160.99 
Total=76 1520 
     
 
Economy Groupings 
 The World Economic Outlook April 2011 of IMF
1
guides our classification of countries 
into advanced, emerging and developing economies. We consider two more broad groupings: 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and OECD
2
 (Organisation for 
                                                          
1 World Economic Outlook April 2011 of IMF (Table 4.1: Economy groupings) is available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf 
2 The details about OECD members are available at http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-
countries.htm 
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Economic Co-operation and Development). Table 2 provides sample description for economy 
groupings. 
Table 2: Sample description for economy groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for economy groupings 
Period Advanced Emerging OECD BRICS Developing Total 
1960-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
1970-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
1980-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
1990-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
2000-2009 32 22 32 5 68 159 
Panel B: Government Debt and GDP Growth in economy groupings 
Countries observations Economies 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
32 640 Advanced 2.39% 2.83% 57.12 53.38 
5 100 BRICS 4.32% 4.70% 46.65 46.79 
57 1140 Developing 3.36% 4.26% 71.63 56.67 
21 420 Emerging 3.41% 4.70% 43.73 41.35 
33 660 OECD 2.64% 2.90% 55.17 51.61 
Total=148 2960 
     
 
Table 3: Sample description for income groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for income groupings 
Period 
Low-income 
(LIC) 
Middle-income 
(MIC) 
High-income 
(HIC) 
Heavily indebted 
poor (HPC) 
Least developed 
(LDC) 
Total 
1960-2009 15 63 44 18 17 220 
1970-2009 16 62 44 19 18 221 
1980-2009 16 62 44 19 18 221 
1990-2009 16 62 44 19 18 221 
2000-2009 10 54 43 11 9 181 
Panel B. Government Debt and GDP Growth in Income groupings 
Countries Observations Economies 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
38 760 High-income countries (HIC) 2.62% 3.10% 49.99 45.89 
16 320 
Heavily indebted poor countries 
(HPC) 
3.12% 3.95% 124.10 103.87 
12 240 Least developed countries (LDC) 3.76% 4.78% 100.86 81.39 
11 220 Low-income countries (LIC) 2.92% 4.17% 91.37 87.06 
34 680 Middle-income countries (MIC) 3.72% 4.56% 52.17 42.73 
Total=111 2220 
     
 
Income Groupings 
 In arranging the data for income groupings, we follow the World Bank classification of 
economies
3
updated for the fiscal year 2015. We consider high-income economies (HIC), 
                                                          
3 World Bank country classification is available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups Accordingly, 
low income countries are those with gross national income (GNI) per capita of $1,045 or less; middle income countries, 
$1,046–12,745; high-income countries, $12,746 or more. The least developed countries (LDC) are classified as per the 
criteria set by the United Nations Economic and Social Council.  
Details available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf 
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heavily indebted poor countries (HPC), least developed countries (LDC), low-income 
economies (LIC), and middle-income economies (MIC). Table 3 provides the description of 
our sample based on income groupings. 
 
Political governance groupings 
 We consider seven well acknowledged types of political governance systems; coalition-
governments countries (CC), dictator-led countries (DC), federal democracies (FD), Islamic 
countries (IC), monarchy countries (MC), parliamentary democracies (PD), and 
socialist/communist countries (SC). In doing so, we are guided by the World Factbook of 
CIA
4
 and Encyclopedia Britannica. Table 4 provides the description of our sample based on 
political economy considerations. 
 
Table 4: Sample description for political governance groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for political governance groupings 
Period 
Socialist or 
Communist 
Countries 
(SC) 
Dictator 
led 
Countries 
(DC) 
Coalition 
Countries 
(CC) 
Monarchy 
Countries 
(MC) 
Islamic 
Countries 
(IC) 
Parliamentary 
Democracies 
(PD) 
Federal 
Democracies 
(FD) 
Total 
1960-2009 2 12 54 4 23 45 21 161 
1970-2009 2 12 54 4 23 45 21 161 
1980-2009 2 12 54 4 23 45 21 161 
1990-2009 2 12 54 4 23 45 21 161 
2000-2009 2 8 48 4 18 37 19 136 
Panel B:  Government Debt and GDP Growth in political governance groupings 
Countries Observations Countries 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
31 620 Coalition Countries (CC) 3.10% 3.24% 66.24 61.59 
10 180 Dictator led Countries (DC) 3.85% 4.45% 87.63 69.63 
14 280 Federal Democracies (FD) 3.11% 3.36% 54.26 54.83 
23 440 Islamic Countries (IC) 4.16% 4.90% 72.76 64.76 
4 80 Monarchy Countries (MC) 4.92% 4.86% 40.31 23.61 
16 320 Parliamentary Democracies (PD) 3.03% 3.15% 67.81 65.12 
2 40 Socialist/Communist Countries (SC) 6.32% 5.75% 36.44 18.74 
Total=98 1960 
     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) are classified according to the World Bank and IMF as part of their debt-relief 
initiative. These classifications are detailed in the World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) 2014 of the United 
Nations employed to delineate trends in various dimensions of the world economy. Also, refer Handbook on the Least 
Developed Country Category: Inclusion, Graduation and Special Support Measures (United Nations publication). Available 
from http://www.un.org/esa/analysis/devplan/cdppublications/2008cdphandbook.pdf 
4 The World Factbook of The Central Intelligence Agency of United States provides information on the history, people, 
government, economy, geography, communications, transportation, military, and transnational issues for 267 world entities. 
Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
Encyclopedia Britannica | political system. Details available at http://www.britannica.com/print/topic/467746 
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Regional groupings 
 The fifth of our groupings is based on geographical considerations. We consider six 
broad classifications - Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania and South America. In 
doing so, we follow the classifications detailed in the publication of United Nations Statistics 
Division
5
. Table 5 provides the description of our sample based on regional groupings.  
 
Table 5: Sample description for regional groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for regional groupings 
Period Asia South America North America Europe Africa Oceania Total 
1960-2009 25 16 10 39 27 5 122 
1970-2009 25 16 10 39 27 5 122 
1980-2009 25 16 10 39 27 5 122 
1990-2009 25 16 10 39 27 5 122 
2000-2009 24 17 9 36 18 3 107 
Panel B: Sample description for regional groupings 
Countries Observations Regions 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
21 420 Africa 3.35% 3.92% 91.94 80.08 
19 380 Asia 4.49% 5.18% 57.36 52.23 
34 680 Europe 1.99% 2.92% 55.04 51.47 
7 140 North America 3.50% 3.47% 57.45 54.85 
4 80 Oceania 2.92% 3.14% 42.39 43.87 
15 300 South America 3.66% 3.96% 69.25 45.66 
Total=100 2000 
     
 
Subsampling 
 We explore the dimension of historical specificity by examining real GDP growth by 
government debt category for subsampled periods of the data: 1960-2009, 1970-2009, 1980-
2009, 1990-2009, and 2000-2009. We do not extend our dataset beyond 2009, in view of the 
sudden and significant rise in government debt levels consequent to the government 
interventions in response to global financial crisis
6
.  
                                                          
5 United Nations Statistics Division - Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49). Details available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm 
 
6 In industrial countries, government debt has risen significantly. In 2009, the net sovereign borrowing needs of the United 
Kingdom and the United States were five times larger than the average of the preceding five years (2002–07). The huge 
stimulus and bailout package adopted by the US government to deal with the crisis delivered by irresponsible financial 
agents in 2009 took the net government debt to GDP ratio in the U.S. from 42.6 in 2007 to 72.4 percent in 2011. In advanced 
economies as a whole, government debt to GDP ratios are expected to reach 110 percent by 2015—an increase of almost 40 
percentage points over pre-crisis levels (IMF 2010). Many middle-income countries also witnessed a deterioration of their 
debt positions, although the trends are not as dramatic as those of advanced economies are. In low-income countries, in 
2009–10 the present value of the government debt to GDP ratio has deteriorated by 5–7 percentage points compared with 
pre-crisis projections (IDA and IMF 2010). 
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Figure 1: Debt in debt regimes 
This figure illustrates the trend of government debt in debt regimes (0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 91-150; 151 and above). We notice a rising trend of debt with a median of 
27.79 percent of GDP in DR 0-30. We find a flat trend with a median at 45 in DR 31-60. A decreasing trend is noticed in DR 61-90 with the median level at 82.87. DR 
91-150 has a declining trend with a median of116.51. In DR 151 & above, we notice the trend like an inverted crescent shape with a median of 160.99.     
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Figure 2: Debt in economy groupings 
This figure presents the trend of debt in the economy groupings of sovereign countries. Debt in advanced economies (with a median 53.38) and BRICS 
economies (46.79) is rising. Developing countries (56.67) and emerging economies (41.35) do not experience a rising trend of debt. However, the trend of 
debt in OECD countries (51.61) appears to be flat since 1990. 
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Figure 3: Debt in income groupings 
This figure presents the trend of debt in the income groupings of sovereign countries. Debt in High-income countries (HIC) (with a median 45.89) is very 
slowly rising. Heavily indebted poor countries (HPC) (103.87) group is experiencing a declining trend. Least developed countries (LDC) (81.39) show a 
gentle decline since 2005. Low-income countries (LIC) (87.06) show the trend like an inverted crescent shape. Middle-income countries (MIC) (42.73) 
confirm a mild declining trend. 
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Figure 4: Debt in political governance groupings 
This figure presents the trend of debt in the political governance groupings of sovereign countries. The trend of debt in coalition countries (CC) (with a median 
61.59) is almost flat. Dictator led countries (DC) (69.63) show a declining trend. Federal democracies (FD) (54.83) and parliamentary democracies (PD) (65.12) display 
almost a plane trend of debt. Islamic countries (IC) (64.76), monarchy countries (MC) (23.61), and socialist/communist countries (SC) (18.74) show a declining trend 
of debt. 
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Figure 5: Debt in Regional groupings 
This figure presents the trend of debt in the regional groupings of sovereign countries based on their geographies. Africa (median 80.08) with higher levels of debt 
shows a declining trend. Asia (52.23) and Europe (51.47) show a mildly growing trend of debt. The trend of debt in North America (54.85) appears to be flat. Oceania 
(43.87) with fewer countries shows a smoothly rising trend of debt. South America (45.66) with few of its countries experiencing very high debt levels displays 
decreasing trend.  
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Variables 
We provide in Table 6 the description of variables and data sources. 
Table 6: Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description 
adr  
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working-age population) 
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or 
older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64. Data are 
shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population. 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 
fce  
Final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
Final consumption expenditure is the sum of household final consumption 
expenditure (private consumption) and general government final consumption 
expenditure (general government consumption). Source: WDI 
fdi  
Foreign direct investment,  
net inflows (% of GDP) 
Foreign direct investments are the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.  
Source: WDI 
gdpgr (GDPgrowth) 
Real GDP growth (annual %) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency. Source: WDI 
gfc  
General government final 
consumption expenditure 
(annual % growth) 
Annual percentage growth of general government final consumption 
expenditure based on constant local currency. Source: WDI 
gfcf  
Gross fixed capital formation 
(annual % growth) 
Average annual growth of gross fixed capital formation based on constant 
local currency. Source: WDI 
ggd (debt) 
General government gross 
debt 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of 
interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the 
future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, 
debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee 
schemes, and other accounts payable.   
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff (RR) 
data set 
infl  
Inflation (annual %) 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. Source: WDI 
pg  
Population growth (annual %) 
Annual population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of 
midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Source: WDI 
rir 
Real interest rate (%) 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator.  
Source: WDI 
tgdp (openness) 
Trade (% of GDP) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product. Source: WDI 
ulf 
Unemployed labour force 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate). 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and 
unemployment differ by country. Source: WDI 
  
 
 
3. The Debt – Growth nexus 
 In economic theory, at moderate levels of government debt, following a typical 
Keynesian behaviour, fiscal policy may induce growth. The classical economic view is that 
government debt (manifesting deficit financing) can induce growth by stimulating aggregate 
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demand and output in the short run. Moderate levels of debt are found to have a positive 
impact on economic growth through a range of channels: improved monetary policy, 
strengthened institutions, enhanced private savings, and deepened financial intermediation 
(Abbas and Christensen, 2007). On the other hand, it is argued that government debt crowds 
out capital and leads to slowdown of output in the long-run (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). 
Historically, the theoretical literature argues that growth models amplified with governments 
issuing debt to fund consumption or capital goods tend to exhibit a negative relationship 
between government debt and economic growth. Modigliani (1961) argues that government 
debt is a burden for the posterity that results in waning flow of income from a reduced stock 
of private capital. 
 
 Both the neoclassical and endogenous growth models inform the negative effect of 
government debt on long-term growth. Government debt could have a substantial adverse 
effect on economic outcomes if it affects the productivity of public expenditures (Teles and 
Cesar Mussolini, 2014). Analyzing the impact of fiscal policy, proxied inter alia by the level 
of government debt, in endogenous growth models, Aizenman et al., (2007) find a negative 
relationship. Standard growth theory advocates that an increase in government debt (due to a 
fiscal deficit) leads to slower growth. On the other hand, the neoclassical growth theory 
suggests a temporary decline in growth along the transition path to a new steady state. 
However, the endogenous growth theory suggests a permanent decline in growth as the debt 
increases (Saint-Paul, 1992). 
 
 Government debt could be used to smoothen distortionary taxation over time (Barro, 
1979). Barro‘s model predicts that debt responds to the temporary deviation in income or 
government expenditure and hence, in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, debt would be 
constant and equal to its ‗initial‘ level. Though appealing as a normative theory, Barro‘s 
model is incompatible to two situations: (i) debt to GDP levels in U.S display mean-
reversion, which implies the existence of a fundamental long-term level of debt; (ii) evidence 
from war episodes suggests temporary increases in expenditure are financed with a mix of 
instruments, including taxes. Expansionary fiscal policies that lead to debt accumulation are 
argued to have a positive effect on both short and long-term growth (DeLong and Summers, 
2012). In a theoretical model integrating the government budget constraint and debt 
financing, Adam and Bevan (2005) find increase in growth during low debt levels as they 
15 
 
observe interaction effects between deficits and debt stocks, with high debt stocks 
exacerbating the adverse consequence of high deficits. 
 
 Empirical literature on this topic is yet growing (for e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; 
Kumar and Woo, 2010; Cecchetti et al., 2011; and Baum et al., 2013). Several studies report 
a negative non-linear correlation between public debt and economic growth in advanced and 
emerging market economies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Reinhart et al., 2012; Kumar and 
Woo, 2010; Cecchetti et al., 2011; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012). Though, there is 
growing evidence that government debt is negatively correlated with economic growth, very 
few studies make a strong case for a causal relationship going from debt to growth. Some 
authors (for e.g. Panizza and Presbitero, 2014) offer a causal interpretation to their findings 
and use the debt-growth link as an argument in support of fiscal consolidation. Lof and 
Malinen (2014) using data on 20 developed countries, estimate panel vector auto regressions 
to analyze the relationship between government debt and economic growth and find no 
evidence for a robust effect of debt on growth, even for higher levels of debt. However, they 
observe significant negative correlation due to reverse effect of growth on debt. This study 
intends to provide a thorough analysis based on diverse countries groups and wider dataset. 
 
4. Estimation Strategy 
 We embark on a multi-step approach to explore our secular dataset covering the period 
from 1960 to 2009 and thoroughly investigate the nexus between government debt and 
growth. We employ both the descriptive statistics approach (as relied by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) in their influential paper) and econometric approach to illustrate the debt – growth 
nexus. 
1. Testing the bivariate relationship 
 In our econometric approach to address the topic, we begin by probing the bivariate 
linear relationship between debt and growth with the following specification: 
 t
j
t
j
t debtGDPgrowth 
-------- Eqn (1) 
Where GDPgrowth
j
t
 is the annual GDP growth and debt
j
t
 is the outstanding gross 
government debt to GDP ratio for country ‗j‘ in year‗t‘. We estimate the Eqn (1) with a 
pooled panel and with country fixed effects. 
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2. Testing the linear relationship 
 We probe the linear relationship with an econometric specification based on the 
empirical growth literature (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). We introduce other 
significant macroeconomic variables in order to account their simultaneity of impact. In 
estimating our panel data growth regressions with country-specific and time-specific fixed 
effects, we are motivated by Islam (1995), which allows us to estimate the impact of a change 
in any one factor on growth within a country in the data panel. 
 jttj
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
fdigfctgdpfcegfcfdebtGDPGDPgrowth   ),,,,(
j
t1
 
--------  Eqn (2) 
Where µj is country fixed effects; νt is time fixed effects; εjt is the error term. 
3. The augmented Solow growth regression model 
 We extend our econometric specification using a Solow growth model. Following this 
model, our specification assumes that the structural growth for country ‗j‘ conforms to a 
linear relationship over a period‗t‘ and is common across the panel of countries.  
 jttj
j
t
j
t XGDPgrowth 

 
  jttj
j
tjS
j
t debtSGDPgrowth 
^
------- Eqn (3) 
Where Sj is a vector of Solow regressors including gfcf, gfc, tgdp, fce, fdi, infl, lagged GDP, 
pg, and adr. It also includes the constant. µj is country-specific fixed effects; νt is time-fixed 
effects; εjt is the unobservable error term. Given the strong potential for endogeneity of the 
debt variable, we use instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique. In our instrumental 
variables model, we use Solow instruments in their lagged variables. As Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993) observe, one of the most likely sources of simultaneity is business cycle effects and 
the tendency of government expenditure to be positively correlated with the level of GDP per 
capita. Many studies on growth regressions exploring panel data have made use of IV 
approach to deal with the issue of simultaneity bias (see Hiebert et al. 2002). With the use of 
GMM estimator, we seek to correct for the possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the error structure by using the consistent estimator. The two-step GMM provides some 
efficiency gains over the traditional IV/2-SLS estimator derived from the use of the optimal 
weighting matrix (Baum et al., 2013).  
4. Testing for nonlinearity 
In the debt-growth dynamics literature, the nonlinearity of the impact of debt on economic 
growth has been examined in different specifications. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) use the 
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correlations between debt and growth. On the other hand, Kumar and Woo (2012) and Egert 
(2015) study the relationship using the growth framework. While many empirical papers 
identify non-linearities in the relationship between debt and growth, very few studies make a 
clear theoretical argument for the presence of such non-linearities (Greiner, 2013).  
 
We investigate the nonlinearity of the debt-growth relationship (in view of the negative 
correlations at higher levels of debt with growth) by considering a specification that accounts 
for the polynomial trend of the debt variable. To introduce the smooth transition around a 
turning point in debt level, in its impact on economic growth, we transform the Eqn (3) to 
formulate the following specification by introducing a square term of the debt to GDP ratio as 
an additional regressor: 
  jtt
j
j
tjS
j
t
j
tdebtdebtSGDPgrowth
 

2
^
------- Eqn (4) 
Robustness checks 
In order to ensure that the outliers do not influence the results, we identify the outliers 
by drawing the scatterplot of the partial correlation between debt and growth obtained with 
the IV regression and estimate the models by dropping them. We also employ robust least 
squares (RLS) regression method designed to be robust, or less sensitive to outliers. We use 
M-estimation method of RLS. Using the Huber–White sandwich correction, serially 
correlated residuals are dealt with in the context of the presence of within-country time 
dependence and heteroscedacity of unknown form. An alternative approach of using the 
Newey and West estimator that allows modeling the autocorrelation process in the error term 
is also employed. The method of PCSEs (suggested by Beck and Katz) is very robust when 
there is little or no correlation between unit effects and explanatory variables. It is argued that 
its performance declines as the correlation strengthens. We use the fixed effects estimator 
with robust standard errors that appears to do better in these situations (Kristensen and 
Wawro, 2003). 
 
5. Results and discussion  
 We begin our discussion on results with the descriptive statistics approach (as relied by 
RR (2010) in their influential paper). In Figure 6.1, we first provide a comparative analysis of 
the growth in different debt regimes comparable to those of RR. It is interesting to note that 
as the debt regimes rise there is a decrease in the growth levels. We notice a higher growth 
(mean 5.06 and median 4.83) in the debt regime of 0-30 percent of GDP and gradually 
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decreasing in subsequent higher debt regimes. Growth levels in terms of both mean (1.86) 
and median (1.88) are abysmally low in the debt regime of 91-150 percent of GDP. 
Especially, in very high debt regime of above 151 percent of debt to GDP, the growth is 
negative (mean -1.08 and median -1.32). 
 
RR observe that the difference in median growth rates of GDP between low debt 
(below 30 percent of GDP) and high debt (above 90 percent of GDP) groups is 2.6 
percentage points in advanced economies over the period. On a similar comparison, we find 
that for our full sample, the difference in the median growth rates of GDP between low debt 
regime (below 30 percent of GDP) and high debt regime (91-150 percent of GDP) is 2.95 
percentage points. The difference in the median growth rates of GDP between low debt 
regime (below 30 percent of GDP) and very high debt regime (above 151 percent of GDP) is 
6.15 percentage points. RR state that the difference in average growth rates between low and 
high debt is even larger (4.2 percentage points) for the advanced economies. Our study finds 
that the difference in average growth rates between low debt (below 30 percent of GDP) and 
high debt (91-150 percent of GDP) groups is 3.2 percentage points. The difference in average 
growth rates between low debt (below 30 percent of GDP) and very high debt (above 151 
percent of GDP) groups is 6.14 percentage points. 
 
Figure 6: Growth in Debt Regimes  
We present in Figure 6.1 the GDP growth and median inflation in the debt regimes comparable to that 
of RR‘s categories. The number of observations in our sample (in RR sample) in the first four regimes 
is 160 (443), 620 (442), 400 (199) and 260 (96), for a total of 1440 (1180) observations. Our fifth debt 
regime of >151% is having 80 observations. In Figure 6.2 we present summary relationship of GDP 
growth and median inflation in the four groupings out of the full sample comparable to RR‘s four 
categories. In Fig. 3 we present the RR‘s results. 
     1. Growth and inflation in               2. Growth and inflation in debt       3. Growth and inflation in RR debt  
            our five debt regimes                      regimes comparable to RR‘s.          regimes (Fig. 2 of R&R, 2010)     
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Figure 7: Debt, Inflation and Growth 
1. Debt, inflation and growth: 1960–2009     2. Inflation and growth in median debt levels 
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We find inflation not necessarily influencing high debt levels across countries (Figure 
7). The median debt levels have soared particularly during 1980-2000. However, the inflation 
levels have not experienced drastic and noticeable rise during the corresponding period. 
Median inflation and median GDP growth have mostly moved in tandem during the 
corresponding debt levels during 1960-2009 (Figure 7.2). The interaction of government debt 
with growth in the full sample suggesting the negative relationship is presented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Government debt and economic growth 
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We provide in Figure 9, a discrete graphical analysis of the correlation between debt 
and growth in the debt regimes. In the debt regimes – 0-30%, 31-60% and 61-90%, the GDP 
growth hovers in the positive level and tends to fall into the negative zone in the debt regime 
– 91-150%. In the debt regime >151%, the GDP growth runs in the negative zone 
demonstrating debt intolerance. 
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Figure 9: Government Debt and Growth in debt Regimes 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in debt regimes: 0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 91-150; 151 % above for the period from 1960-2009.  
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 Analysis of inflation–growth nexus in the economy groupings reveals highest growth 
(mean 4.32 and median 4.70) in BRICS economies with mean debt 46.65 and median debt 
46.79 (Figure 10). Further, a higher growth (mean 3.41 and median 4.70) is observed in 
emerging economies with (mean debt 43.73 and median debt 41.35). Developing economies 
experience average growth 3.36% (median growth 4.26%) with mean debt level 71.63 
(median debt 56.67). OECD economies experience average growth 2.64% (median growth 
2.90%) with mean debt level 55.17 (median debt 51.61). We notice advanced economies 
experiencing average growth 2.39% (median growth 2.83%) with mean debt 57.12 (median 
debt 53.38). 
Figure 10: Inflation and Growth in Economy groupings 
 
 
 
 We notice that the difference in median growth rates of GDP between low debt group 
(emerging economies) and high debt group (advanced economies) is 1.87 percentage points. 
On a similar comparison, the difference in the median growth rates of GDP between 
emerging economies and BRICS economies is 0.01, between emerging economies and 
OECD economies, it is 1.81, and between emerging economies and developing economies it 
is 0.45 percentage points. 
 
We present our analysis of the correlation between debt and growth in our five broad 
economy groupings more discretely in Figure 11. Advanced and OECD economies 
experience growth that shows positive correlation in contrast to the negative correlation 
observed in developing and emerging economies. BRICs economies exhibit unique behaviour 
and need greater attention for analysis. 
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Figure 11: Government debt and growth in economy groups 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in economy groupings: advanced countries, BRICS, developing countries, 
emerging countries, and OECD countries during the period 1960-2009. 
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 Analysis of inflation–growth nexus in the Income groupings is provided in Figure 12. 
We notice highest growth (mean 3.76 and median 4.78) in LDC group (mean debt 100.86 and 
median debt 81.39) associated with a median inflation of 10.77. Further, higher growth (mean 
3.72 and median 4.56) is observed in MIC group (mean debt 52.17 and median debt 42.73) 
associated with a median inflation of 7.63. HPC group experiences average growth 3.12% 
(median growth 3.95%) with mean debt 124.10 (median debt 103.87) and median inflation 
9.37%. LIC group experiences average growth 2.92% (median growth 4.17%) with mean 
debt 91.37 (median debt 87.06). We notice HIC group experiencing average growth 2.62% 
(median growth 3.10%) with mean debt 49.99 (median debt 45.89) and median inflation 
2.73%. The difference in median growth rates of GDP between low debt group (HIC) and 
high debt group (HPC) is 0.85 percentage point. Median inflation for the different debt 
groupings based on incomes suggests an apparent pattern – inflation levels move upward 
from high-income countries to low income countries. 
 
Figure 12: Inflation and Growth in Income groupings 
 
 
We illustrate in Figure 13, the interplay between debt and growth in our income 
groupings. HIC and LDC groups experience growth that hovers much in the positive levels in 
contrast to that in LIC and HPC groups where the growth tends to slide into the negative zone 
demonstrating the debt intolerance as they go through high debt levels. LDC group displays a 
distinct behaviour, which deserves in depth analysis. 
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Figure 13: Government debt and growth in income groups 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in income groupings: high-income countries (HIC), highly indebted poor countries 
(HPC), least developed countries (LDC), low-income countries (LIC), and middle-income countries (MIC) during the period 1960-2009.  
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 Figure 14 illustrates the interesting facts of the dynamics of government debt, inflation 
and growth in different political economies. Socialist/communist (SC) countries with highest 
growth rates (mean 6.32 and median 5.75) and lowest debt level (mean debt 36.44 and 
median 18.74) among the compared categories experience median inflation of 7.7 percent. 
On the contrary, parliamentary democracies (PD) experience lowest growth rate (mean 3.03 
and 3.15) with mean debt 67.81 (median debt 65.12) are associated with lowest median 
inflation of 3.82 percent. Monarchy countries (MC) experience lowest debt level (mean debt 
40.31 and median debt 23.61) experience mean GDP growth 4.92 (median 4.86) and lowest 
median inflation 2.98 percent. In contrast, dictatorship countries (DC) experience highest 
debt level (mean debt 87.63 and median debt 69.63) with mean growth 3.85 (median 4.45) 
and highest median inflation 8 percent. Apparently, we do not notice a specific pattern. 
 
Figure 14: Debt, Inflation and Growth in Political governance groupings 
 
 
  
 Islamic countries (IC) experience average growth 4.16% (median growth 4.90%) with 
mean debt 72.76 (median debt 64.76) and median inflation 6.52%. Coalition-governments 
countries (CC) with median inflation 3.98% are found to be associated with mean debt 66.24 
(median debt 61.59) and mean growth rate 3.10% (median growth 3.24%). Federal 
democracies (FD) experience average growth 3.11% (median growth 3.36%) with mean debt 
54.26 (median debt 54.83) associated with median inflation of 6.52%. The difference in 
median growth rates of SC (low debt group) and DC (high debt group) is 1.3-percentage 
point. We provide in Figure 15, the correlation between debt and growth in the political 
governance based groupings in detail. DC, MC, SC and IC political economies experience 
growth that hovers much in the positive levels in contrast to that in PD, CC and FD political 
economies where the growth tends to glide into the negative zone indicating debt intolerance 
as they go through higher debt/GDP levels.  
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Figure 15: Government debt and growth in political governance groupings 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in political governance groupings: Islamic countries (IC); coalition countries (CC); dictator 
led countries (DC); federal democracies (FD); monarchy countries (MC); parliamentary democracies (PD); and socialist countries (SC) during the period 1960-2009. 
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 Figure 16 illustrates the dynamics of government debt, inflation and growth in different 
regional economies. Asia with highest mean growth rate 4.49 (median 5.18) and mean debt 
57.36 (median 52.23) experiences median inflation 5.89 percent. On the contrary, Europe 
experiences lowest mean growth rate 1.99 (median 2.92) with mean debt 55.04 (median debt 
51.47) and median inflation 3.28 percent. Oceania with lowest debt level (mean debt 42.39 
and median debt 43.87) experiences mean growth 2.92 (median 3.14) and lowest median 
inflation 2.93 percent. On the contrary, Africa with highest debt level (mean debt 91.94 and 
median debt 80.08) experience mean growth 3.35 (median 3.92) and median inflation of 8 
percent.  
Figure 16: Inflation and growth in regional groupings 
 
  
 South America (SA) experiences average growth 3.66 (median growth 3.96) with mean 
debt 49.25 (median debt 45.66) and highest median inflation 8.23 percent. On the contrary, 
North America (NA) with lowest median inflation 2.60 experiences a mean growth 3.50 
(median growth 3.47) associated with mean debt 57.45 (median debt 54.85). The difference 
in median growth rates of GDP between OA (low debt group) and Africa (high debt group) is 
0.78 percentage point.  
 
We provide in Figure 17, the correlation between debt and growth in regional 
groupings. Oceania and North America experience growth that hovers much in the positive 
levels in contrast to that in Asia, Africa, Europe and south America where the growth tends to 
drift smoothly into the negative zone demonstrating the negative correlation as they 
experience higher debt levels.  
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Figure 17: Government debt and growth in regional groupings 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in regional groupings: Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South 
America during the period 1960-2009. 
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 Table 7: Government debt and Economic Growth - Regression Results 
This table presents the results of the regressions for understanding the effect of debt on the long-term growth of countries. Our dependent variable is the GDP growth. 
Columns (1), (2) and (5) present the results of the Panel Least Squares (PLS). Columns (3) and (6) present the results of the Panel Generalized Method of Moments (PGMM) 
(Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance). Columns (4), (5) and (7) present the results of Robust Least Squares. We report the coefficient values marked with 
significance levels in the first row followed by the standard errors (in the parenthesis) in the second row. Asterisks ***, ** indicate levels of significance at 1%, and 5% respectively. 
Dep. Variable: GDP growth 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 Mean  
(Std. Dev.) 
Eqn. (2) Eqn. (2) PLS Eqn. (3) PGMM Eqn. (3) RLS Eqn. (4) PLS Eqn. (4) PGMM Eqn. (4) RLS 
Explanatory Variables Linear models Non-linear models 
General government gross 
debt (Debt) 
56.11  
(56.46) 
-0.014*** -0.003* -0.003* -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.023*** -0.0079*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.0025) 
Debt Sq. 
3912  
(31139) 
    
0.0000178 0.0000466** 1.24E-05** 
    
(0.0000166) (0.0000210) (1.06E-05) 
GDPGR(-1) 
3.85 
(5.49) 
 
0.218*** 0.218*** 0.261*** 0.306*** 0.189*** 0.249*** 
 
(0.018) (0.029) (0.011) (0.018) (0.028) (0.011) 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
5.85  
(42.10) 
 
0.015*** 0.015*** 0.181*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.181*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0009) 
Government expenditure 
4.66 
(18.54) 
 
0.013*** 0.013** 0.015*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) 
Trade Openness 
72.89 
(51.74) 
 
0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
Final consumption 
expenditure 
81.24  
(13.71) 
 
-0.069*** -0.069*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.063*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) 
Foreign direct investment 
2.73  
(4.62) 
 
0.061*** 0.059*** -0.003 0.063*** 0.053** -0.0019** 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.0114) 
Population growth 
1.69  
(1.22) 
   
0.198*** 0.292*** 0.126 0.223 
   
(0.042) (0.067) (0.218) (0.042) 
Inflation 
45.13  
(552.47) 
   
-0.0001* -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.00075** 
   
(0.0001) (0.0001) 0.0001 (7.41E-05) 
Intercept  
4.682*** 8.128*** 8.140*** 2.259*** 3.732*** 8.197*** 2.468*** 
(0.109) (1.254) (1.389) (0.341) (0.544) (1.526) (0.346) 
R-squared  0.179 0.293 0.292 0.350 0.219 0.308 0.35545 
Obs  3607 2643 2640 2640 2621 2621 2621 
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Figure 18: Gross fixed capital formation as a causal link that goes through debt to growth as an instrumental variable 
We present in the figures below the relationship between debt, gross fixed capital formation and economic growth. The first figure illustrates the association of 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) with debt. The second figure captures the relationship between GFCF and GDP growth that is similar to the relationship of debt 
with growth. The third figure presents the association of debt with GFCF and GDP growth. As debt increases, growth as well as GFCF decrease indicating a nonlinear 
relationship.   
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 We now discuss the results of the econometric analysis of the debt-growth relationship 
encompassing the econometric specifications for (a) testing the bivariate relationship as 
modeled in Eqn. (2); (b) testing the linear relationship as modeled in Eqn. (3); (c) testing the 
augmented Solow growth model in Eqn. (4); and (d) testing for nonlinearity as modeled in 
Eqn. (5). Table 7 presents the results of the analyses. As observed in other studies as well, 
simple bivariate panel regression reveals a negative relation between growth and government 
debt. Though the coefficient is always negative, its size is mostly not substantial in economic 
terms. The results of the linear specifications suggest econometrically significant negative 
association of debt with growth. As we analyse the nonlinear models, the econometric 
significance as well as the coefficient value increase for debt in its relationship with 
economic growth.  
 
 We notice the causal link going from debt to growth through the instrumental variable – 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). The results of panel GMM regressions with IV 
approach suggest the significant role of GFCF in causing the relationship between debt and 
economic growth. Figure 18 further illustrates the intricate relationship. As debt increases, 
GDP growth as well as GFCF decrease indicating a nonlinear relationship.  
 
 The point estimates of the range of econometric specifications suggest that a 10-
percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with 2 to 23 basis points 
reduction of average growth.  Our results are comparable to the estimates of Kumar and Woo 
(2010) and Égert Balázs (2015) for advanced and emerging economies over almost four 
decades
7
. Studying a sample of 17 OECD countries, Panizza and Presbitero (2014) observe 
that a 10-percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with an 18 basis 
point decline in average growth.  
 
Conclusion 
 This study has presented a thorough analysis of the dynamics of government debt and 
economic growth as it spans across regions, political economies, diverse economies, varied 
income groupings and different debt regimes. The sources on which the study draws are more 
authentic and well accepted. We do not claim that the results are infallible, but do state that 
                                                          
7
 Kumar and Woo (2010) report that on average, a 10 percentage point increase in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated 
with a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year. Égert Balázs (2015) report 
that 10 percentage increase in the government debt ratio is associated with 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point lower economic 
growth. 
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they are based on widely accepted econometric tools and techniques besides based on sound 
economic logic. One of the contributions of this study is that it is the first of its kind in 
providing a meticulous analysis of debt and growth in different of groupings and sub-
groupings of countries spanning across time period since 1960. The study enhances our 
understanding of the long-term dynamics of debt and economic growth in diverse economic 
environments and periods of recent history of economic activity. The study provides an 
original analysis of the debt and growth beyond the popular discourse mostly surrounding the 
advanced countries.  
  
 Debt in advanced and BRICS economies is rising steadily. Advanced economies, as 
they maintain higher levels of debt, they experience lower rate of economic growth. On the 
other hand, emerging economies with lowest debt level experience higher rate of growth. 
Interestingly, BRICS countries as a distinct group experience highest rate of economic 
growth in spite of having moderate levels of debt. Economy groupings analysis does not 
provide any apparent pattern of the debt–growth relationship across the groups emphasising 
the existence of non-linear nature of relationship. 
 
 Heavily indebted poor countries with very high debt levels experience moderate 
economic growth. On the contrary, middle-income countries with lower levels of debt 
experience higher rate of economic growth. Coalition countries and federal democracies 
maintain higher level of debt and experience a moderate rate of economic growth. One 
immediate inference could be that due to the intricate dynamics of coalition politics and 
issues related to states and union, these countries suffer from lack of robust economic policies 
in relation to debt and growth. Perhaps the divergent political forces and philosophies fail to 
converge for a sound policy approach for debt management towards achieving higher 
economic growth. Inspite of having higher level of debt, dictator-led countries experience 
higher rate of growth. Similar is the case with Islamic countries. Perhaps due to the long-
standing dictatorial rulers and political stability in these countries, economic growth has been 
higher in spite of higher levels of government debt. One important take away is that 
parliamentary democracies in spite of having higher debt levels than that of coalition 
countries and federal democracies, have failed to achieve higher rate of economic growth 
than that of these countries. Socialist/communist countries and monarchy countries are found 
to experience very high rate of economic growth as they maintain lower levels of government 
debt. 
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 This study provides a clear understanding about the triad – debt, inflation and growth in 
the case of economy groupings. Emerging economies, developing economies and BRICS 
countries are found to experience higher levels of economic growth in spite of having higher 
levels of inflation. On the contrary, lower rate of economic growth in advanced and OECD 
economies is associated with lower levels of inflation. The analysis of income groupings 
suggests an apparent pattern – inflation levels move upward from high–income countries to 
low income countries. One interesting observation is that Islamic countries with highest level 
of inflation have highest debt level. In line with the same logic, monarchy countries that 
experience lowest inflation have lowest debt level. Amongst regional groupings, Africa with 
highest debt level is associated with high level of inflation. Oceania with lowest debt level is 
associated with low inflation. Thus, rising debt levels are positively associated with 
increasing levels of inflation.  
 
 To conclude, this study observes a negative relationship between government debt and 
growth. The point estimates of the range of econometric specifications suggest that a 10-
percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with 2 to 23 basis point 
reduction in average growth. Our results establish the nonlinear relationship between debt 
and growth.   
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Appendices 
Annexure 1: Countries covered in Debt Regime groupings 
1 DR 0-30 (21) 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Rep., Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Namibia, 
Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Romania, Slovenia, and Thailand. 
2 DR 31-60 (31) 
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  
El Salvador, France, Ghana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela, RB. 
3 DR 61-90 (22) 
Algeria, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Arab Rep., Egypt, Arab Rep., 
Greece, Ireland, Panama, and Singapore. 
4 DR 91-150 (8) 
Belgium, Burundi, Central African Republic, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan. 
5 DR 151 and above (5) Congo, Dem. Rep., Cyprus, Malta, Nicaragua, and Zambia 
 
 
 
Annexure 2: Countries covered in Economy groupings 
1 
Advanced Countries 
(27) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
2 BRICS (5) Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
3 
Developing Countries 
(57) 
Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cameroon, China, Colombia, Congo, Congo Rep, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic,  Lesotho, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Zambia 
4 
Emerging economies 
(21) 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.  
5 OECD Countries (33) 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and United States. 
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Annexure 3: Countries covered in Income groupings 
1 
High Income Countries 
HIC (38) 
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, 
China, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad 
and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States 
2 
Highly indebted Poor 
Countries HPC (16) 
Bolivia, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo DR, Congo R, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Uganda, and Zambia. 
3 
Least Developed 
Countries LDC (12) 
Bhutan, Burundi, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Nepal, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia 
4 
Low Income Countries 
LIC (11) 
Burundi, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Uganda 
5 
Middle Income 
Countries (34) 
Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
China, Colombia, Congo R, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mauritius,  
Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, South 
Africa, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela 
 
 
Annexure 4: Countries covered in Political economy groupings 
1 Coalition Countries (31) 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and 
United Kingdom. 
2 
Parliamentary 
Democracies (16) 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, and Turkey. 
3 Islamic Countries (22) 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, 
Gambia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uganda. 
4 Dictator led Countries (8) 
Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tunisia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
5 Monarchy Countries (4) Bahrain, Jordan, Luxembourg, and Oman 
6 Federal Democracies (14) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, 
India, Mexico, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. 
7 
Socialist/Communist 
Countries (2) 
Algeria and China 
 
 
Annexure 5: Countries covered in Regional groupings 
1 Africa (21) 
Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo DR, Congo R, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia 
2 Asia (19) 
Bhutan, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea R, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey 
3 Europe (34) 
Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom 
4 
North 
America (07) 
Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and United States 
5 Oceania (04) Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea 
6 
South 
America (15) 
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
